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CHAPTER 9
BEYOND CRISES:
THE UNENDING CHALLENGE OF  
CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
AND MATERIALS
Matthew Bunn
The case studies presented in this volume are 
invaluable contributions to thinking about an impor-
tant aspect of the nuclear danger—the potential for 
loss of control as states with nuclear weapons go 
through periods of political turmoil and unrest.
From Sokov, we have the alarming spectacle of 
military forces digging a trench in the runway with 
cannon fire to scare off a crowd in order to fly nuclear 
weapons away before armed gangs arrive and seize 
them. From Tertrais, we have a situation full of uncer-
tainty over which group of generals those with control 
of a nuclear weapon to be tested will be loyal to—and 
then the nuclear core being driven across the desert 
in a deux chevaux. From Stokes, we have the world’s 
only  case  of  an  armed  nuclear  missile  being  fired 
over a long range and then detonated—and word of 
radical factions among nuclear custodians squabbling 
with other factors over control of key nuclear facili-
ties. From Khan, we have a more reassuring argument 
that Pakistan’s seemingly endless political turmoil has 
never seriously threatened its nuclear control, though 
well-organized attacks on heavily guarded strategic 
targets such as the Rawalpindi General Headquarters 
and the Mehran Naval Base—apparently with insider 
help—inevitably raise worries about the possibility of 
similar attacks on nuclear facilities. 254
But in a way, each of these case studies is the begin-
ning, not the end, of a history. They open intrigu-
ing and important questions, but do not provide the 
answers we need to understand the full implications 
of these events. In most of these cases, we do not know 
in detail how close the nation came to losing control 
of nuclear weapons, what actors might have been 
attempting to get them, or what these actors’ plans 
might have been.
One thing seems clear: Political chaos, turmoil, 
and insurgency in a state armed with nuclear weap-
ons are extraordinarily dangerous things. Removing 
nuclear weapons from regions that may be vulnerable 
to such turmoil, providing multiple layers of security 
for nuclear weapons, and doing everything possible 
to strengthen governance and reduce the chances of     
turmoil in states with nuclear weapons all seem to be 
urgent tasks. Today, they may be most urgent in the 
very different cases of North Korea—whose dictato-
rial regime surely cannot last forever (though analysts 
have been saying that for 2 decades)—and Pakistan, 
where substantial security measures must protect 
against extraordinary threats from possible insiders, 
from outsiders, and from both working together. In 
both cases, how to accomplish the tasks of strength-
ening governance and reducing the chance of loss of 
control remain very much open questions.
But I would argue that the cases presented here 
tell only a small part of the history of nuclear security. 
They focus only on security for nuclear weapons, not 
nuclear material, and only on moments of turmoil and 
crisis, which are blessedly rare.
The broader story is that securing both nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable nuclear material has 
been a difficult challenge throughout the nuclear age, 255
in normal times and in crisis. Indeed, the nuclear thefts 
that have genuinely occurred have been of weapons-
usable nuclear materials, not nuclear weapons (fortu-
nately), and they have not occurred in the midst of 
political turmoil. If we want to understand the risks 
of nuclear theft—the central issue nuclear security 
measures are designed to address—we need to look 
beyond the windows we have peered through at   
this workshop.
REAL THEFTS, ATTACKS, AND INTRUSIONS: 
SOME CASES
Theft of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, 
the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, is not 
a hypothetical worry—it is an ongoing reality. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has 
documented some 18 cases of theft or loss of pluto-
nium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) from 1993-
2007 that were confirmed by the states concerned. See 
Table 1.1 (These cases involving real weapons-usable 
nuclear material are only one small part of the broader 
phenomenon of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radio-
active materials; the IAEA has reported hundreds of 
situations involving other materials.) Three of these 
cases (New Jersey, in 2005; Fukui, Japan, in 2005; and 
Hennigsdorf, Germany, in 2006) involve inadvertent 
loss, leaving 15 involving instances of intentional theft 
and smuggling. Of those, five involve less than a gram 
of material, and are included here only because of 
the possibility that these are samples of larger stocks 
available to the smugglers—as smugglers often claim 
is the case.256
Table 1. HEU and Plutonium Incidents 
Confirmed to the ITDB, 1993-2007.
Date  Location Material Involved Incident Description
5/24/1993  Vilnius, Lithuania  HEU/ 150 g 
4.4 t of beryllium including 140 kg contaminated 
with HEU were discovered in the storage area of 
a bank. 
3/?/1994 
St. Petersburg, Rus-
sian Federation 
HEU/ 2.972 kg 
An individual was arrested in possession of HEU, 
which he had previously stolen from a nuclear facil-
ity. The material was intended for illegal sale. 
5/10/1994 
Tengen-Wiechs, 
Germany 
Pu/ 6.2 g 
Plutonium was detected in a building during a 
police search. 
6/13/1994  Landshut, Germany  HEU/ 0.795 g 
A group of individuals was arrested in illegal pos-
session of HEU. 
7/25/1994  Munich, Germany  Pu/ 0.24 g
A small sample of PuO2-UO2 mixture was confis-
cated in an incident related to a larger seizure at 
Munich Airport on 1994-08-10. 
8/10/1994 
Munich Airport, 
Germany 
Pu/ 363.4 g PuO2-UO2 mixture was seized at Munich airport.
12/14/1994 
Prague, Czech 
Republic 
HEU/ 2.73 kg 
HEU was seized by police in Prague. The material 
was intended for illegal sale. 
6/?/1995 
Moscow, Russian 
Federation 
HEU/ 1.7 kg
An individual was arrested in possession of HEU, 
which he had previously stolen from a nuclear facil-
ity. The material was intended for illegal sale. 
6/6/1995 
Prague, Czech 
Republic 
HEU/ 0.415 g  An HEU sample was seized by police in Prague. 
6/8/1995 
Ceske Budejovice, 
Czech Republic 
HEU/ 16.9 g 
An HEU sample was seized by police in Ceske 
Budejovice. 
5/29/1999  Rousse, Bulgaria  HEU/ 10 g
Customs officials arrested a man trying to smuggle 
HEU at the Rousse customs border check point. 
12/?/2000  Karlsruhe, Germany  Pu/ 0.001 g
Mixed radioactive materials including a minute 
quantity of plutonium were stolen from the former 
pilot reprocessing plant. 
7/16/2001  Paris, France  HEU/ 0.5 g
Three individuals trafficking in HEU were arrested 
in Paris. The perpetrators were seeking buyers for 
the material. 
6/26/2003  Sadahlo, Georgia  HEU/ ~170 g 
An individual was arrested in possession of HEU 
upon attempting to illegally transport the material 
across the border. 
3/?/2005 to 
4/?/2005 
New Jersey, USA  HEU/ 3.3 g
A package containing 3.3 g of HEU was inadver-
tently disposed of. 
6/24/2005  Fukui, Japan  HEU/ 0.0017 g 
A neutron flux detector was reported lost at an 
NPP. 
2/1/2006  Tbilisi, Georgia  HEU/ 79.5 g 
A group of individuals was arrested trying to 
illegally sell HEU. 
3/30/2006  Hennigsdorf, Germany  HEU/ 47.5 g 
Authorities discovered trace amounts of HEU on a 
piece of tube found amidst scrap metal entering a 
steel mill. 257
Unfortunately, after 2008, the IAEA stopped issu-
ing public updates of this list of HEU and plutonium 
incidents. This does not mean, however, that incidents 
stopped occurring. The Georgian government has 
confirmed that in March 2010, Georgian agents seized 
approximately 18 grams of HEU just below 90-percent 
enrichment from smugglers who crossed into Geor-
gia from Armenia. The smugglers reportedly claimed 
that more was available.2 In June 2011, authorities in 
Moldova arrested six people who reportedly had 4.4 
grams of weapons-grade HEU. The smugglers claimed 
to have access to nine kilograms of HEU, which they 
were willing to sell for $31 million. Moldovan officials 
report that “members of the ring, who have not yet 
been detained, have one kilogram of uranium.” This 
case appears to involve a real buyer–still at large–and 
the possibility that there are kilograms of weapon-
grade HEU in the smugglers’ hands, making it poten-
tially the most serious case in years.3
In addition to these cases confirmed to the IAEA, 
there is strong evidence that a number of additional 
thefts have occurred—including confessions and con-
victions for some of the perpetrators—which the states 
concerned have not confirmed to the IAEA. In partic-
ular, there was a well-documented theft of 1.5 kilo-
grams of 90-percent-enriched HEU in 1992 (described 
in detail below), and two thefts from Russian naval 
facilities in 1993 that are not included in the IAEA 
database. Thus, there appear to be approximately 20 
well-documented cases of actual theft and smuggling 
of plutonium or HEU in the public record.4 At the clas-
sified level, the U.S. Government regards a significant 
number of additional cases as confirmed.258
To these cases of actual theft and smuggling of plu-
tonium and HEU must be added a substantial number 
of attempts, attacks, and intrusions that have taken 
place over the years. These include, among others: the 
still-unexplained apparent loss of hundreds of kilo-
grams of HEU at the Nuclear Materials and Equipment 
Corporation (NUMEC) in the mid-1960s (which the 
balance of the evidence suggests was a theft by senior 
facility officials on behalf of Israel);5 a 1982 incident in 
which an insider at the Koeberg nuclear power plant 
in South Africa planted and detonated explosives on 
the steel pressure vessel (before fuel had been loaded, 
intended only to raise alarm, not to spread radioac-
tivity);6 incidents in 2001 in which terrorist teams car-
ried out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear weapons 
storage sites, and apparently also on nuclear weapon 
transport trains;7 and a 2007 intrusion in South Africa 
in which two teams of armed men attacked the Pelind-
aba site, where hundreds of kilograms of HEU are 
stored (with one of the teams penetrating a 10,000 volt 
security fence, disabling intrusion detectors, going to 
the emergency control center and shooting a worker 
there after a struggle, and departing without ever 
being engaged by site security forces).8
In short, the threats are out there. In a world that 
includes terrorists with global reach, effective nuclear 
security and accounting measures are needed wher-
ever nuclear weapons, plutonium, or HEU exist. All 
countries with such stockpiles on their soil should 
ensure that they are at least protected against a modest 
group of well-armed, well-trained outsiders; a well-
placed insider; and both outsiders and an insider work-
ing together, using a broad range of tactics. Countries 
that face more substantial adversary threats—Paki-
stan being an obvious example—need to provide even 
higher levels of protection.9259
Unfortunately, in many countries around the 
world, the security measures in place today are 
demonstrably  not  sufficient  to  protect  against  the 
kinds of threats terrorists and thieves have already 
shown they can pose. For example, a U.S. team visit-
ing a foreign site with a Category I quantity of HEU 
from 2005 to 2010 found that there were no fences 
around the perimeter, no sensors to detect intrusions, 
no video surveillance systems to help guards assess 
the cause of alarms generated by sensors, and no vehi-
cle barriers.10 (It is a reasonable bet that this facility 
also did not have an on-site armed response team to 
protect it from armed attackers.) The U.S. team rec-
ommended that all of these basic security measures 
be put in place, which the country agreed to do. But 
when a team of congressional auditors visited in 2010-
11, some of the improvements were still under way.   
The fact that such glaring weaknesses still existed at 
a site with Category I materials years after the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 (9/11), attacks speaks volumes about 
the urgent work still ahead to plug nuclear security 
weak points around the world. Indeed, I would argue 
that every country with nuclear weapons or weap-
ons-usable nuclear materials—including the United 
States—has more to do to ensure that these items are 
effectively protected.
PUNCTUATING COMPLACENT EQUILIBRIUM: 
THE U.S. CASE
If political turmoil is not the most important driver 
of nuclear security problems, what is? In a word, com-
placency—the belief that nuclear terrorism is not a 
serious threat, and that whatever security measures 
are in place today are already sufficient. The history of 260
nuclear security is a story of punctuated equilibrium, 
with long stretches of complacency and little change 
punctuated by moments when something—typically, 
a major incident of some kind—made it possible to 
move the system to a higher-security state, from 
which it would then begin to drift slowly into compla-
cency again. The results of incidents and other events 
are mediated by the different political cultures and 
institutions in different countries, so that one country 
might react to an incident by establishing substantial 
new security rules, while another might react by hav-
ing participants in the system offer explanations why 
it could never happen again.
For a brief picture of this kind of punctuated equi-
librium, consider the history of nuclear security in the 
United States, which today probably has more strin-
gent nuclear security rules and higher nuclear secu-
rity expenditures than any other nation on earth. The 
Department of Energy (DOE) alone now spends some 
$1.8 billion a year on security, most of which goes 
to secure the nuclear weapons and weapons-usable 
materials it controls.11
From the beginning, the U.S. nuclear weapons pro-
gram had substantial layers of security. But also from 
the beginning, there were serious weaknesses, high-
lighted by events such as the loss of nuclear weapon 
design information to the Soviet Union and driving 
the plutonium pit for the Trinity Test across the desert 
in an ordinary four-door Packard.
The first major puncture in the complacent equilib-
rium surrounding security for nuclear weapons was 
the 1960 visit by a team from the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy (JCAE) to bases in Europe where U.S. 
nuclear weapons were stored. They were appalled by 
the limited measures in place to prevent the seizure 261
or unauthorized use of a U.S. nuclear weapon. At one 
base, for example, the team saw aircraft armed with 
fully operational U.S. nuclear weapons, ready to take 
off at a moment’s notice, with foreign pilots. “The 
only evidence of U.S. control was a lonely 18-year-old 
sentry armed with a carbine and standing on the tar-
mac.”12 This led to the decision to develop and install 
the first primitive permissive action links (PALs) on 
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
The situation with respect to weapons-usable 
nuclear materials was much worse. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) liter-
ally imposed no rules at all concerning how private 
companies with weapons-usable nuclear material 
had to secure such stocks, believing that because the 
material was valuable, companies would protect it 
adequately themselves.13 Various authors pointed out 
that the consequences to society of the theft of enough 
nuclear material for a bomb were far greater than the 
financial value of the material, but logic was not suf-
ficient to overcome complacency. Official government 
reports include photographs of items such as canis-
ters containing 48 kilograms of HEU sitting on a dolly 
unguarded at an airport, waiting for a flight, or the 
exterior wall of a building that served as the principal 
barrier to accessing HEU that was so thin it could be 
cut open with tin snips.14 The privately owned plu-
tonium reprocessing plant at West Valley had many 
bombs’ worth of separated plutonium on site, with 
only one guard during the day and none at night.15 
Nuclear material accounting was in its infancy and 
terribly inaccurate, and really tamper-resistant seals 
were not in use.
It was conditions such as these that existed at 
the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation 262
(NUMEC) in Apollo, Pennsylvania, in the 1960s, 
when the poor accounting records that existed seemed 
to suggest that hundreds of kilograms of HEU were 
missing. I doubt we will ever know for sure, but the 
balance of evidence suggests that senior management 
of the facility stole a large amount of HEU and pro-
vided it to Israel.16 (This reminds us that insider pro-
tection programs must include the senior leaders of a 
site among those they are designed to protect against.) 
Later in 1965, there was another large incident of 
HEU material unaccounted for (MUF) at the Nuclear 
Fuel Services (NFS) plant in Irwin, Tennessee 17—a 
plant that continued to have problems for decades   
thereafter  with MUFs larger than the statistical   
limits permitted. 
The NUMEC and NFS episodes were another 
puncture for the complacent equilibrium. The AEC 
tightened material accounting rules, and designated 
Los Alamos as the lead laboratory to develop tech-
nology for nondestructive assay and other means of 
nuclear material accounting. Ironically, the develop-
ment of many of the technologies used for interna-
tional safeguards around the world today was initi-
ated in response to concern about a possible theft 
in one unsafeguarded nuclear program on behalf of 
another unsafeguarded nuclear program. The AEC 
tasked an advisory group to review its safeguards 
program, and in 1967, the group recommended drastic 
improvements in security and accounting, warning—I 
believe, for the first time ever in a U.S. Government 
report—that terrorists might be able to get weapons-
usable nuclear material and make a crude nuclear 
bomb.18 Advocates within the AEC, notably Theodore 
B. Taylor, were pushing for action to improve nuclear 
security, and warning of a possible nuclear terrorist 263
threat.19 By 1970, the AEC finally issued requirements 
for private companies with weapons-usable nuclear 
material to provide some protection for it, though 
these initial regulations were quite weak.
The next puncture in the equilibrium came quickly: 
the Munich Olympics. Suddenly, the idea that a large, 
well-armed, and well-trained team could strike in 
the heart of a modern developed country was not a 
hypothetical worry but a stark reality. Congress held 
hearings that publicly chastised weak AEC security 
requirements,  and  the  General  Accounting  Office 
(GAO) conducted a damning investigation. In 1973, 
the AEC imposed new nuclear security requirements 
and designated Sandia as the lead lab to develop and 
evaluate physical protection technologies. The Sandia 
experts began taking a systems engineering approach 
to security, carefully examining each pathway adver-
saries might use to get to a nuclear weapon and how 
it might be blocked, and found many gaping vulnera-
bilities in the security systems that existed at the time. 
As one of the grand old men of U.S. physical protec-
tion put it to me, “Before 1973, the only reason we 
never lost a nuclear weapon is that no one ever tried to   
take one.”20
Throughout the 1970s, new challenges never let 
the system return to a complacent equilibrium. Grow-
ing public distrust of government and corporate 
assurances in general, and nuclear energy in particu-
lar; the debate over a plutonium economy, with the 
expectation that scores and eventually hundreds of 
plutonium-fueled reactors would soon be built and 
that tens of thousands of people would have direct 
access to separated plutonium; the Indian nuclear 
test in 1974; the continuation of international terrorist 
attacks (along with attacks and nuclear hoaxes within 264
the United States); and a stream of investigations and 
analyses highlighting the dangers of plutonium and 
HEU and the possibility of nuclear terrorism com-
bined to produce continuing public and government 
alarm. Indeed, provisions of the Energy Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1974, which split the AEC, made it clear 
that Congress expected the new Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission (NRC) to take on the security issue 
immediately. By the end of the 1970s, the new DOE 
and the NRC had both, for the first time, established 
rules requiring that facilities have security measures 
in place able to provide protection against a specified 
“design basis threat” (DBT), and had begun perfor-
mance tests including force-on-force exercises to test 
how well security systems worked in practice—usher-
ing in the modern era of nuclear security.
With the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, fol-
lowed by Chernobyl in 1986, and with the Cold War 
heating up, public attention turned to nuclear safety 
and nuclear war in the 1980s, and there was little pub-
lic discussion of the danger of nuclear terrorism. Nev-
ertheless, intensive congressional investigations of 
DOE security lapses (led by Rep. John Dingell); secu-
rity tests in which security systems failed to protect 
against plausible adversary threats; and concern over 
truck bombs following the bombing of the Marine bar-
racks in Lebanon in 1983 combined to drive further 
improvements in nuclear security. In 1985, then-Sec-
retary of Energy John Herrington formed a “Special 
Project Team” to carry out a fast-paced review of secu-
rity at all DOE facilities. The team found a wide range 
of vulnerabilities and made 94 recommendations for 
action. Over the next few years, DOE spent an esti-
mated $1.5 billion upgrading physical security to 
implement these recommendations in an effort known 265
as “Project Cerberus,” named after the mythical 
guardian of the gates of hell.21 Yet, within a few years 
complacency had crept back: Security budgets began 
to fall again, and DOE security managers warned that 
if immediate actions were not taken, nuclear weapons 
and materials could not be adequately secured.22
In 1996, DOE published Plutonium: The First 50 
Years, an account of the U.S. plutonium inventory, 
which listed 2.8 tons of plutonium as officially unac-
counted for. This was a remarkable confirmation of the 
results of decades-long complacency about material 
control and accounting in the U.S. nuclear complex.23 
Subsequently, a comparable report on the HEU stock-
pile reported 3.2 tons of HEU unaccounted for.24 These 
amounts represent sufficient material for hundreds of 
nuclear bombs. It is very likely that some of it was lost 
to waste, some of it represented overestimates of how 
much material was produced in the first place, and 
none of it was actually stolen, but the accounting was 
so poor that we will never know for sure. 
The next really dramatic puncture in the equilib-
rium was the 9/11 attacks. DOE and NRC ratcheted 
up their nuclear security requirements, new security 
performance testing programs were put in place, and 
more—which brings us more or less to where we are 
today. Events such as the inadvertent flight of the six 
warheads across the country suggest that in some 
areas, complacency is back.
It is important to understand that each of these 
improvements  was  resisted.  Both  industrial  firms 
and operators of government facilities complained 
that the old approaches were enough, that the new 
requirements were needlessly expensive and burden-
some, and that the threats were overstated. The firms 
and operators lobbied to weaken various proposed 266
rules and procedures, and often succeeded. What is 
striking is that the degree of satisfaction with security 
measures already in place appears to be completely 
independent of what those security measures actually 
were; even when the AEC first required that transports 
of HEU and plutonium have at least a couple of armed 
guards, the industry complained that this was unnec-
essary and probably ineffective.25 Nevertheless, over 
the years, the trend has been one of halting improve-
ment in nuclear security over time, and industry has 
usually come eventually to accept and support the 
requirements.
The bad news in this story is that the richest and 
most powerful country on earth, with the most nuclear 
security experience, found achieving effective nuclear 
security to be an enormous challenge. Effective secu-
rity took decades to accomplish—and remains in 
some respects unfinished—and it often took dramatic 
incidents such as major losses of nuclear material or 
terrorist attacks to lead to change.
The good news in this story is that on several occa-
sions, “incidents” that could be generated by policy—
congressional investigations, testing programs, analy-
ses, and reviews—were sufficient to lead to important 
improvements in nuclear security. We are not doomed 
to wait until catastrophe strikes before nuclear secu-
rity improvements are made. But how can policy 
drive such change more effectively in the future—in 
the United States and elsewhere?
OVERCOMING COMPLACENCY
For years, as this history was playing out within 
the United States, the U.S. Government has been seek-
ing to convince countries around the world to improve 267
nuclear security, with varying degrees of success. Pol-
icy tools have included attempting to negotiate trea-
ties, such as the Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Materials and its 2005 amendment; seek-
ing ever-more-specific IAEA nuclear security recom-
mendations, such as the recent revision of Information 
Circular 225 (INFCIRC/225, the IAEA physical pro-
tection recommendations referenced in many nuclear 
supply agreements); and pursuing technical coopera-
tion to upgrade security—as in the Nunn-Lugar pro-
gram and larger related efforts funded by the National 
Nuclear Security Administration. Other tools include 
helping to consolidate dangerous nuclear stocks to 
fewer locations, for example, by converting HEU-
fueled research reactors and removing their HEU; 
passing United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions (UNSCR), such as UNSCR 1540, which legally 
obligates all countries to provide “appropriate effec-
tive” security and accounting for whatever stockpiles 
they may have; and, most recently, the nuclear secu-
rity summit process, which brings dozens of heads 
of state together to commit to take action to improve   
nuclear security.26
What the United States has been seeking to do, 
in effect, is to accelerate this process of punctuated 
equilibrium, to convince countries to improve their 
nuclear security faster and more extensively than they 
otherwise would have. While each of these efforts 
has had its value, I believe the time has come for the 
United States and other countries to take on the driv-
ing cause of weak nuclear security—complacency—
more directly.
The fundamental key to success in improving 
nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism is 
to convince political leaders and nuclear managers 268
around the world that nuclear terrorism is a real and 
urgent threat to their countries’ security, worthy of a 
substantial investment of their time and money. These 
countries must also be convinced that actions on their 
part are necessary to reduce the risk—something many 
of them do not believe today. If they come to feel that 
sense of urgency, they will be likely to take the needed 
actions to prevent nuclear terrorism; if they remain 
complacent, they will not. Some of the critical work of 
building this sense of urgency is already being done; 
the Nuclear Security Summit made some inroads 
in convincing some policymakers that the threat of 
nuclear terrorism was real, as has the Global Initiative 
to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. But much more needs 
to be done if President Barack Obama’s objective of 
ensuring effective security for all vulnerable nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable materials worldwide is 
to be achieved. 
There are three layers of complacency that must be 
overcome: (1) the belief that terrorists could not plau-
sibly make a bomb; (2) the belief that nuclear security 
measures are already adequate, so terrorists could not 
plausibly get the materials needed for a bomb; and, 
(3) the belief that even if terrorists could get nuclear 
material and could make a crude bomb, it is a U.S. 
problem, not one other countries need to worry about 
very much.
President Obama should work with other countries 
to take several steps to overcome this complacency 
and build the needed sense of urgency and commit-
ment as described below.27 269
Joint Threat Briefings and Assessments. 
Upcoming summits and other high-level meetings 
with key countries should include detailed briefings 
for both leaders on the nuclear terrorism threat, given 
jointly by U.S. experts and experts from the country 
concerned. These would outline the very real pos-
sibility that terrorists could get nuclear material and 
make a nuclear bomb, the global economic and politi-
cal effects of a terrorist nuclear attack, and steps that 
could be taken to reduce the risk. U.S. briefings for 
U.S. and Russian officials highlighting intelligence on 
continuing nuclear security vulnerabilities were a crit-
ical part of putting together the Bush-Putin Bratislava 
Nuclear Security Initiative. With some key countries, 
the United States should seek agreement to draft joint 
assessments of the threat, following on the recent non-
governmental U.S.-Russian assessment.28
Intelligence Agency Discussions. 
In many countries, the political leadership gets 
much of its information about national security threats 
from its intelligence agencies. It is therefore extremely 
important to convince the intelligence agencies in 
key countries that nuclear terrorism is a serious and 
urgent threat—and that plausible actions, taken now, 
could reduce the risk substantially. During the second 
George W. Bush term, DOE intelligence was actively 
working with foreign intelligence services to make this 
case and to build cooperation against the threat. This 
effort should be renewed and expanded to include 
focused efforts by the Director of National Intelli-
gence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other U.S. 
intelligence agencies as well.29270
The “Armageddon Test.” 
President Obama should direct U.S. intelligence—
possibly working in cooperation with agencies in 
other countries—to establish a small operational 
team that would seek to understand and penetrate 
the world of nuclear theft and smuggling. The team 
would be instructed to seek out sources willing to sell 
nuclear material for a bomb. If they succeeded, this 
would dramatically highlight the continuing threat, 
and potentially identify particular weak points and 
smuggling organizations requiring urgent action. If 
they failed, that would strongly suggest that terror-
ist operatives would likely fail as well, building con-
fidence  that  measures  to  prevent  nuclear  terrorism 
were working.30 
Nuclear Terrorism Exercises. 
Building on the exercise program that has begun 
in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 
the United States and other leading countries should 
organize a series of exercises with senior policymak-
ers from key states. These exercises should have sce-
narios focused on: the theft of nuclear material; the 
realistic possibility that terrorists could construct a 
crude nuclear bomb if they got enough HEU or plu-
tonium; the difficulty of stopping them once they had 
the material; and, the degree to which  all countries 
would be affected if a terrorist nuclear bomb went 
off.31 Participating in a realistic exercise can reach offi-
cials emotionally in a way that briefings and policy 
memos cannot. A program of such exercises should 
become a central element of the Global Initiative.271
Fast-Paced Nuclear Security Reviews. 
The United States and other leading countries 
should encourage leaders of key states to pick teams 
of security experts they trust to conduct fast-paced 
reviews of nuclear security in their countries, assess-
ing whether facilities are adequately protected against 
a set of clearly defined threats—such as a well-placed 
insider, or two teams of well-armed, well-trained 
attackers. In the United States, such fast-paced reviews 
after major incidents such as 9/11 have often revealed 
a wide range of vulnerabilities that needed to be fixed.
Realistic Testing of Nuclear Security Performance. 
The United States and other leading countries 
should work with key states around the world to 
implement programs to conduct realistic tests of the 
ability of nuclear security systems to defeat either 
insiders or outsiders. Failures in such tests can be 
powerful evidence to senior policymakers that nuclear 
security needs improvement.
Shared Databases of Threats and Incidents. 
The United States and other key countries should 
collaborate to create shared databases of unclassi-
fied information on actual security incidents at both 
nuclear sites and at non-nuclear, guarded facilities, 
which offer lessons for policymakers and facility 
managers to consider in deciding on nuclear security 
levels and particular threats to defend against. The 
World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) could 
be a forum for creating one version of such a threat-
incident database. In the case of safety, rather than 272
security, reactor operators report each safety-related 
incident to groups such as the Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations (the U.S. branch of the World Asso-
ciation of Nuclear Operators), and these groups ana-
lyze the incidents and distribute lessons learned about 
how to prevent similar incidents in the future to each 
member facility—and then carry out peer reviews to 
assess how well each facility has implemented the   
lessons learned.32
THE PATH FROM HERE
There is a great deal to be done to ensure that effec-
tive and lasting security and accounting are in place 
for all nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear 
materials around the world. Nuclear security, like 
nuclear safety, will require constant vigilance and a 
focus on continual improvement—as long as nuclear 
weapons and weapons-usable materials continue   
to exist. 
The case studies in this volume have made a valu-
able contribution to understanding how states have 
handled these matters in decades past. But there 
is much yet to be done to understand the history of 
nuclear security. To find the most effective policies 
to strengthen nuclear security worldwide, we need   
to know:
•    Why have different countries made very differ-
ent decisions about what nuclear security and 
accounting rules to put in place?
•    What factors have led countries to change their 
nuclear security and accounting practices?
•    What factors have been the most important 
obstacles to, and constraints on, such changes?
•    What approaches can best strengthen secu-273
rity culture, convincing all key staff of nuclear 
operations to take security seriously and con-
stantly seek ways to improve it?
•    What measures could best ensure that once 
effective nuclear security and accounting 
measures and strong security cultures have 
been put in place, they are sustained for the   
long haul?
Once we have learned some of the answers to these 
questions, we will be in a better position to judge how 
countries might best be convinced to make decisions 
that would drastically reduce the danger that nuclear 
weapons or the materials needed to make them could 
be stolen and fall into the hands of terrorists.
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